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AgenShield is a security product in its own right. On Windows its background service runs as LocalSystem and, as part of normal operation, starts Windows’ own administration tools: Windows PowerShell with Base64-encoded scripts, the .NET C# compiler, and certutil.exe. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) products watch for exactly these building blocks, because attackers use them too. A product that judges the pattern alone can classify AgenShield’s helpers as malicious, stop them, or quarantine AgenShield’s files. This page tells your security team what to expect, so that it can recognize AgenShield’s activity and exclude it narrowly. It is general guidance that applies to most endpoint security products. Your security product’s own documentation is authoritative for how its exclusions behave.
An exclusion in your security product changes what that product watches. It does not change what AgenShield allows a governed agent to do. To let an agent, or a program it starts, reach something your policy blocks, see What an agent’s programs inherit.

What AgenShield installs on Windows

The installer places AgenShield’s programs under %ProgramFiles%\AgenShield (normally C:\Program Files\AgenShield) and its machine-wide configuration under %ProgramData%\AgenShield. The Windows service restarts automatically if it stops unexpectedly.

How the programs are signed

Current Windows releases sign every program image they install (.exe, .dll, .node) with Frontegg’s EV code-signing certificate: The certificate is renewed before it expires, and a renewed certificate has a new thumbprint. An exclusion pinned to this exact certificate, rather than to the Frontegg LTD publisher, must then be updated. Two exceptions are expected:
  • A bundled third-party runtime file that already carries its publisher’s valid signature keeps that signature.
  • The driver is signed by Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher, through Microsoft’s driver attestation.
Check the signatures on a device rather than relying on this list, in an administrator PowerShell session:
Every row should read Valid. A NotSigned or HashMismatch row is not something to exclude: report it, and reinstall a current release from your organization’s campaign.

What AgenShield starts, and why

AgenShield does not ship its own copies of Windows tools. It starts the ones in Windows. Long-lived PowerShell sessions do most of the routine work, so a healthy device shows a few long-running powershell.exe processes under agenshield-daemon.exe, not a new one for every check. Some sessions close after a period without use and start again when next needed. A few checks start a short-lived PowerShell instead, as listed below. PowerShell is started with -NoProfile -NonInteractive, and its script is passed on the command line, usually Base64-encoded with -EncodedCommand. That is what an EDR product typically reports as an encoded or obfuscated PowerShell command. The driver trace session writes to %SystemRoot%\System32\LogFiles\WMI\AgenShield-Driver.etl. When AgenShield confines a governed agent, the AgenShield service starts the agent itself, under a separate local account. In your security product’s process tree, that agent and everything it runs appear below agenshield-service.exe. This matters for exclusions; see Choosing exclusions.

What AgenShield reads

AgenShield reads two levels of process detail. Routinely, to recognize AI agents, it reads the process list: each process’s ID, parent, start time, and program name. This listing does not read any command line. It then reads the command line and the program’s path of the processes it can act on, once for each process, when it first sees it. That includes the ones already running when a PowerShell session starts. These are:
  • the AI agents in your organization’s policy catalog;
  • programs a process rule in your policy could match, and script interpreters such as Node.js or Python when your policy has process rules;
  • programs that start MCP servers, such as npx, uvx, or docker, and the shells and runtimes that host them.
Other applications, such as browsers and password managers, are not read routinely unless your policy names them. On specific events, it reads the ID, parent, start time, program path, and command line of every running process once, to rebuild its view of which processes belong to which agent. That happens when the background service starts, when the driver restarts, when your organization’s agent catalog changes, and when AgenShield may have missed process events. These reads include whatever applications are running at that moment and also occur on Windows devices without the AgenShield driver. For possible agents, AgenShield also checks the program file’s publisher signature. The host information it reads is listed in the table above. What AgenShield records and sends is described in Privacy and data handling. AgenShield does not read browser data, saved passwords, or credential stores. Windows keeps a process’s command line in that process’s own memory, so some EDR products report a command-line query as a read of another process’s memory, and name the process it was read from. Earlier releases also read the command line of every new process routinely, so a security product monitoring those releases can show such reads against unrelated applications at any time, not only at the events above.

Choosing exclusions

Apply these principles whichever product you use:
  1. Identify AgenShield by its signer, not by file hashes. Every AgenShield update changes the hashes, so a hash-based exclusion stops matching at the next update. An exclusion for the Frontegg LTD publisher keeps matching; one pinned to the certificate itself needs updating when it is renewed.
  2. A signer exclusion does not cover the Windows tools. powershell.exe, csc.exe, certutil.exe, and logman.exe are signed by Microsoft. Never exclude them globally, or by Microsoft’s certificate: that would exempt every PowerShell session on the device, including an attacker’s.
  3. Cover the tools only as children of agenshield-daemon.exe. Where your product offers it, use an exclusion that applies to the AgenShield background service and the processes it starts, or tune the specific detection to that parent. agenshield-daemon.exe starts Windows tools such as those listed above; it does not start AI agents.
  4. Never extend a child-process exclusion to agenshield-service.exe or agenshield.exe. Governed agents are started through them. An exclusion that covers their children also covers the AI agents and every program the agents run, which is the activity you most want your security product to see.
  5. Scope and review. Apply exclusions to the device groups where AgenShield is installed, use the least permissive option that resolves the problem, and review them when you upgrade either product.

Exclusion types to look for

Most endpoint security products offer some of these. Prefer them in this order:
  1. A publisher or certificate exclusion for Frontegg LTD. It covers AgenShield’s own programs and keeps matching across updates. Some products need the signing certificate itself, which you can export from a signed AgenShield file:
  2. Tuning of a single detection on an AgenShield helper, created from that detection, with conditions on its parent process (agenshield-daemon.exe) and limited to the device groups where AgenShield is installed. Keep any image name or command line condition as narrow as the detection allows.
  3. A path exclusion for agenshield-daemon.exe that also covers its child processes, if helpers are still stopped. Where a product offers several exclusion modes, start with the least permissive one. Use a mode that covers child processes only for agenshield-daemon.exe; see principle 4.
Avoid:
  • exclusions that stop a product from monitoring a process and all its descendants;
  • antivirus process exclusions for powershell.exe, and any exclusion of the Windows tools by path or by Microsoft’s certificate (principle 2);
  • assuming one exclusion covers every engine: in some products an antivirus exclusion applies only to file scanning, not to behavioral detection. Check which part of the product acted before choosing.
Your security product’s documentation describes how to configure each of these. AgenShield support can provide product-specific steps on request.

When a security product interferes

Symptoms

In your security product:
  • Repeated detections or terminations of powershell.exe or csc.exe whose parent is agenshield-daemon.exe, often classified as suspicious script activity or as an encoded PowerShell command.
  • AgenShield files quarantined, or the AgenShield service stopped. Windows restarts the service, so the same detection repeats.
On the device:
  • agenshield status and agenshield doctor show a Host probes warning. There is no such row while everything is healthy, and the warning never names what stopped AgenShield. The same state is included in the device health that AgenShield reports, and in a diagnostic bundle. It has three forms: The number in the message is the actual count. The last part names what is paused: process scans, host probes, or both.
  • While a warning shows, AgenShield waits between attempts, from 30 seconds growing to 5 minutes, and starts at most one PowerShell per attempt. AgenShield’s periodic process checks or host information pause until PowerShell answers again. Newly started AI agents can be recognized late, device details such as hardware or Windows version can show as unknown, and the signed-in user shows as the last one seen for up to 2 minutes and as nobody after that.
  • Network inspection can fail to activate when certutil.exe is blocked.
  • If the background service itself is stopped or quarantined, the device’s Last sync in the Frontegg Portal stops advancing, and the device moves to Drifted and then Offline; see Devices.
Earlier releases started a new encoded PowerShell for every check while a session was unavailable. A security product that kept stopping those sessions therefore saw a rapid series of encoded PowerShell commands from AgenShield.

Confirm it

  1. Run agenshield status or agenshield doctor, and note the time of any Host probes warning.
  2. In your security product, open the detections or blocked events from that time, and confirm that the process tree leads to agenshield-daemon.exe or agenshield-service.exe under C:\Program Files\AgenShield\bin, with a Frontegg LTD signer.
  3. Apply the narrowest exclusion above. A warning about outside termination clears about 10 minutes after the detections stop, and agenshield status no longer shows it. A not answering warning without matching detections points to a problem on the device itself, such as Windows Management Instrumentation, rather than to your security product.
If the security product blocks AgenShield’s installer or driver rather than its helpers, see Windows install warnings. To share evidence with support, see Collecting diagnostics.

macOS

On macOS, AgenShield’s app and both extensions are signed with the Apple Developer ID of Frontegg LTD, Team ID 3R2X6557U2, and identified by bundle identifiers that start with com.frontegg.AgenShield. Use the Team ID for publisher-based exclusions in your security product.